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EVIDENCE OF HYPOTHETICAL BIAS FROM
AN AUCTION EXPERIMENT IN JAPAN
NAOYA KANEKO AND WEN S. CHERN
This paper presents the results of experimental auctions of a genetically modiﬁed (GM) food that
were conducted in Japan. A series of experimental auctions were conducted to elicit consumers’
willingness to pay (WTP) for the selected non-genetically modiﬁed (non-GM) food along with
WTP for its GM counterpart. The paper provides mean bidding prices for the non-GM and GM
food products and analyzes the relationship between bidding prices and consumers’ attitudinal and
demographic variables. It also elicit hypothetical willingness to pay a premium for the non-GM
product. Whereas auction experiments yield a premium of 30-40% of base price, a comparable
hypothetical premium is nearly 90-100% of base price, which provides evidence of large hypo-
thetical bias. Although it is impossible to claim that the experimental subjects are representative
of the regional population, let alone the Japanese population, both qualitative and quantitative in-
formation gathered from the study is useful for anyone involved in the distribution of GM foods.
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Since they became commercial reality in the late nineties, genetically modiﬁed (GM) foods have
been controversial. The European Union have implemented strict labeling rules for GM foods, and
other countries followed suit, largely pushed by popular demands. There are some activities even
in the United States for the introduction of labeling requirements. A number of questions need to
be addressed with regard to the labeling of GM foods, such as whether or not labeling increases
social welfare, or who should pay the cost of labeling. These questions cannot be fully answered
without investigating consumer acceptance. Thus, the main topic of this article is how to measure
consumer acceptance accurately in terms of monetary values.
Japan is one of the most important single countries for U.S. agricultural exporters, importing
from 2001 to 2002 more than 3 million metric tons of soybeans (74% of total imports) and more
than 14 million tons of corn (90% of total imports) from the U.S., which makes the country the
ﬁrst and third largest U.S. export markets of soybeans and corn, respectively. American exporters
have a serious concern in the development in the political environment surrounding the trade of
GM commodities. This article deals with the behavior of Japanese consumers.
In order to study the behavior of Japanese consumers, nonmarket valuation techniques are
useful. Although Japan already has a labeling requirement for GM foods, it has not seen food
products labeled GM in the shelves of the supermarkets in the entire country. The labeling law
consists of two provisions, one for mandatory labeling and the other for voluntary labeling. The
food manufactures chose not to subject themselves to the provision for mandatory labeling of GM
foods; they chose instead to label their products as “non-genetically modiﬁed” under the voluntary
labeling provision. This choice means that they switched from GM to non-GM varieties whenever
their product must be labeled as GM. The outcome is that the Japanese consumers face the choice
between non-labeled and non-GM-labeled foods, both of which are not genetically modiﬁed. Thus,
themarketdataattheretailleveldonotrevealthepremiatheJapaneseconsumersarewillingtopay
to avoid the GM foods, except for a limited number of cases. The nonmarket valuation techniques
are required to overcome the diﬃculty.
1A number of studies have used experimental auctions in order to explore consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for nonmarket commodities such as food safety (Hayes et al., 1995; Fox et al., 2002) or
novel technology such as new packaging (Hoﬀman et al., 1993). The use of experimental method
is not the only way to elicit consumers’ WTP: contingent valuation or conjoint analysis surveys can
also perform the task. However, survey-based methods are known to yield biased welfare measures
because of their hypothetical nature. Unlike the survey-based methods, experimental auction poses
consumers nonhypothetical decision-making, which is expected to yield a more reliable estimate
of WTP.
It is reported by many authors that the willingness-to-pay values tend to be overstated when
consumersanswerhypotheticalsurveyquestions(Fox et al.,1998;List and Shogren,1998;Lusk and Fox,
2003). Experimental auctions may be conducted to remove hypothetical bias, but it is not clear how
eﬀective the experiments are for that purpose, without a direct comparison.1 For this reason, we
asked the experimental subjects to answer a stated-choice question that does not involve actual
transactions. The mean WTP value from the stated choice is compared against the mean WTP
value from the experimental auction in this study.
2 Experimental Design
We conducted an experiment in which GM and non-GM canola oil were involved. The choice of
canola oil was made because it was the only available and acceptable choice. The purpose of the
experiment was to measure the price diﬀerence the consumers were willing to support between the
GMandnon-GMalternativeswhenthealternativeswereexactlythesameinproductcharacteristics
except for the use of GM and non-GM ingredients. One might be tempted to use false products
and make the participants believe that one of the product were made of GM canola while the other
were made of non-GM canola, but the use of deception was hardly justiﬁable because the auction
winners had to pay money to buy the product, and we did not wish the unscrupulous practice to
attract the attention of the Japanese media that is always on the lookout for an outrage related to
GM foods. Since the auctioned products were displayed in front of the experimental subjects, they
needed to look exactly the same. The only product we could manage to ﬁnd that had both GM and
2non-GM varieties readily available in supermarkets and that looked the same was canola oil. We
bought GM and non-GM canola oil of the same size (i.e., 1000 gram bottle) from supermarkets,
peeled oﬀ the product labels, and placed plain labels that said only the name of the products
(namely, either GM or non-GM oil) and their GM status.2 Although the products for display had
plain labels, we guaranteed to the participants that they would purchase the products with the same
original labels as found in store shelves.
We adopted simultaneous bidding for GM and non-GM oil without endowment products. A
number of studies endowed the participants with a baseline product from which the participants
would bid to upgrade to the auctioned product (Buhr et al., 1993; Hayes et al., 1995; Fox, 1995).
The perceived advantages of product endowment include an added incentive to actively partici-
pate in the auction and direct bidding for the price diﬀerence between the baseline and auctioned
products. The main disadvantage is that the participants who prefer the baseline product to the
auctioned product cannot express their willingness to pay a premium for the baseline product. The
disadvantage is especially acute when the product involves ambiguous product characteristics. It
may be true that many consumers prefer the non-GM alternative, but we also expect a minority
of consumers who prefer the GM alternative. The use of product endowment needs a split sample
design with diﬀerent baseline treatments, which requires a larger sample size to achieve a given
statistical precision. Since our study could not attain a large sample size, we avoided product en-
dowment and chose simultaneous bidding for GM and non-GM alternatives for its ﬂexibility in
valuation. Thus, in each trial, all participants were asked to bid simultaneously for the GM and
non-GM oil.
The winner of the auction was determined by the second-price sealed-bid auction as well as
the two-tier random mechanism. There were two trials in each auction. The participants simulta-
neously submit their bids for the GM and non-GM alternatives. The identiﬁcation number of the
participant who submit the highest bid was announced along with the second highest bid for each
product. Another trial was done by asking the participants to submit their bids once again. Then
a straw was randomly drawn to determine which trial was binding (i.e., either ﬁrst or second),
and then another random draw of a straw was made to determine which product (i.e., either GM or
3non-GM) was binding in the chosen trial. A real transaction was made for only the binding product
in the binding trial so that only one product was sold to only one participant in each experimental
session.3 The second-price auction was adopted because it is relatively easy to implement and be-
cause it is a weakly dominant strategy for the participants to reveal their true valuations (Vickrey,
1961; Milgrom and Weber, 1982). The use of random draws was made to control for the so-called
wealth eﬀect, or demand reduction (for demand reduction, see List and Lucking-Reiley 2000).
Each experimental session had two stages. At the ﬁrst stage there were two trials of candy bar
auctions, and at the second stage there were two trials of canola oil auction. The purpose of the
ﬁrst stage was to get participants acquainted with the mechanism of the second-price sealed-bid
auction and random determination of binding trial and product. In each stage, participants bid for
two products, but only one product was actually sold. At the beginning of the experiment, each
respondent was given a small amount of “budget” with which bids were made.
After the experimental auction, the participants were asked to make hypothetical purchase deci-
sions under given price scenarios. A number of studies have made comparison between hypotheti-
cal and nonhypothetical consumer decisions. Blackburn et al. (1994) compared the percentages of
yes responses of hypothetical and nonhypothetical dichotomous choice questions to ﬁnd out that
the participants tend to be more willing to give a yes response in a hypothetical question than in
a nonhypothetical question. The comparison was made for the hypothetical and nonhypothetical
responses from the same group of respondents. Neill et al. (1994) and Fox et al. (1998) compared
the hypothetical bids in an open-ended contingent valuation with the nonhypothetical bids in a
Vickrey second-price auction. Both studies are based on in-sample comparison, but the latter pro-
vides some basis for between-group comparison. The ﬁrst study does not compare bid values, and
the latter studies, while they compare bid values, use open-ended contingent valuation. In the con-
tingent valuation literature, there is ample evidence that open-ended hypothetical questions are less
reliable than closed-ended questions, as suggested by the NOAA guidelines (Arrow et al., 1993).
It is of much interest to see if bid values from experimental auction is comparable to the equiva-
lent values estimated from closed-ended contingent valuation. Thus, we use a paired-comparison
contingent valuation question that is a variant of normal dichotomous choice contingent valuation
4format. Speciﬁcally, we provide the respondents a choice between GM and non-GM canola oil
given the price scenarios. The price of GM oil was set at 250 yen, which is roughly the market
price of GM canola oil. The price of the non-GM oil was set so that it would be 30, 50, 70, and
90% more expensive than the GM oil. The price scenarios were randomly distributed among the
participants. After answering to the contingent valuation questions, the participants ﬁlled out a
questionnaire about demographic information, food purchasing behavior, and perception of GM
foods.
3 Data
A total of 39 consumers were recruited on December 8, 2003, in front of a large supermarket to
participate in the auction experiments in Tsukuba, a city that is one-hour drive from Tokyo (the
Tsukuba group, henceforth). A sign board was placed throughout the day in front of the main
entrance to the supermarket, and a recruitment eﬀort was continued until an enough number of
participants were obtained before each experimental session. There were a total of 6 sessions
conducted on the same day and from 4 to 8 people participated in these sessions.
Another group of 28 consumers were recruited from the staﬀ members of the agricultural eco-
nomics department of the University of Tokyo (the Tokyo group, henceforth). An announcement
of recruitment was distributed to the staﬀ members that only said that the experiment was about
consumer decision making. There were a total of three experimental sessions, one held in the
evening of December 16 and two held in the evening of December 17. Eleven, eight, and nine
people participated in the ﬁrst, second, and third sessions, respectively.
The data from the two groups were pooled for the econometric analysis. Table 1 summarizes
key demographic characteristics of the two groups of participants. A column is added to provide
the comparable ﬁgures for the Japanese population.4 The demographic characteristics of the two
samples are similar, and where some diﬀerences are observed, the diﬀerence in recruitment can
explain them. The Tsukuba group consists of people of more diverse demographic background
than the Tokyo group because the former was intercepted in front of a supermarket whereas the
latter consists of staﬀ members of an academic department. The Tsukuba group contains more
5women and more married people because women and married people are more likely to go to a
supermarket for grocery shopping. The diﬀerence in the presence of kids can also be explained
similarly.
4 Results
Table 2 presents the auction bids for the GM and non-GM canola oil plus the observed premiums
for non-GM oil. A number of facts are observed about the bidding behavior. First, both the mean
and median bids are invariably higher for Tsukuba than for Tokyo irrespective of GM status of
the product. This conﬁrms the ﬁnding of Lusk and Fox (2003), who report higher bids among
ﬁeld experimental subjects, since Tsukuba was a ﬁeld experiment while Tokyo a lab experiment.
Second, the mean and median premiums are smaller for Tsukuba than for Tokyo. This is an
interesting result since ﬁeld subjects are more willing to purchase the GM oil. This means that
the lab subjects submit disproportionately low bids for the GM oil. It remains unclear whether
this is a result speciﬁc to our study or a general pattern because we cannot separate the eﬀect of
ﬁeld-lab variation from that of sample variation. If it is conﬁrmed in a larger-scale study with
appropriate separation of the above confounding eﬀect, it will have an important implication for
similar valuation studies. Third, the percentage of zero bids is lower in the ﬁeld setting, which
lends further support to the hypothesis that the ﬁeld subjects are more willing to make a purchase.
Finally, it appears that the mean bids decline from the ﬁrst trial to the second. However, pooled-
variance t-tests and Wilcoxon tests did not reject the null hypotheses that the mean bids are equal
over trials. Nonetheless, a regression result (not reported here) indicated that the second-trial bids
were aﬀected by the announced price, which may be an indication of aﬃliation or preference
learning. If we believe in aﬃliation, then the ﬁrst trial bid should be used, and if we believe in
learning, then the second should be used. If both eﬀects are present, it seems more likely that
aﬃliation dominates learning with only two trials because learning is expected to take more time.
Hence, the following econometric analysis will be based on the ﬁrst trial bids.
Since there are some diﬀerences in the demographic characteristics between the Tsukuba and
Tokyo experiments, it is desirable that the non-GM premium be calibrated by key demographic
6variables to derive the sample statistics on which to base the policy recommendations. Table 3
provides the results of OLS regression of non-GM premium on individual characteristic variables.
With a small sample of cross-sectional observations, the regression equations do not necessarily
have a good ﬁt. However, the coeﬃcient estimates indicate interesting results. First, as with many
studies of consumer acceptance of GM foods, risk perception signiﬁcantly aﬀects the non-GM
premium (Chern et al., 2002; Kaneko and Chern, 2003). The more the participants perceive risks
about GM foods, the more premium they are willing to pay for the non-GM alternative. The
presence of children also positively aﬀects the non-GM premium. Participants living with children
are willing to pay more premiums on non-GM. In contrast, awareness, trust in the government,
gender, education, and income do not aﬀect the non-GM premium signiﬁcantly. A possible reason
for this is that the dependent variable was constructed by subtracting the GM bid from the non-GM
bid, which is not a binary choice between GM and non-GM. If participants were asked to make a
binary choice, demographic variables may have been more signiﬁcant. In any case, the estimated
coeﬃcients give a predicted value of non-GM premium, which is taken to be a nonhypothetical
willingness to pay for the non-GM oil relative to the GM oil.
The participants answered a hypothetical paired-comparison stated-choice question after they
participated in the experimental auction. They chose either GM or non-GM oil given the price
scenarios. Since the question does not directly elicit the participants’ willingness to pay, we need
to invoke some econometric models to estimate the individual WTP. We consider two models here.
The ﬁrst is the minimum legal WTP model due to Harrison and Kristr¨ om (1995). According to this
model, the respondent’s choice is treated as simply agreeing to a legal contract. If the respondent
chose the non-GM oil when the non-GM and GM prices were 325 yen and 250 yen, respectively,
then the choice would be taken to mean that the respondent were willing to pay a premium of
75 yen to the non-GM oil. If, under the same price scenario, the respondent chose the GM oil,
then that choice would simply mean that the respondent were willing to pay a non-GM premium
of zero. Clearly, this model is ineﬃcient in that it reject the notion of bounding the WTP in an
interval, but it can never demand that the respondents pay a premium that they never agreed to
pay. You should be upset if you chose a product priced at 250 yen but were charged 270 yen even
7though your reservation price for the product were 300 yen.
The other approach is a standard probit model. Let UNG and UGM be the utility functions for

























i indicate the non-GM and GM prices, respectively, and xi is a vector of re-
spondent characteristics. Respondent i chooses the non-GM alternative if and only if UNG
i > UGM
i .
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has a normal distribution. Since the non-GM premium is the maximum amount the respondent is
willing to pay for the non-GM relative to the GM price, it is the price diﬀerence such that Ui = 0.
However, since the utility is itself a random variable, we need to take the expected value to remove





Table 4 shows the parameter estimates of the probit model. Here, signiﬁcant variables in the
previous OLS regression are not signiﬁcant, but the awareness variable (GMUSE) is signiﬁcant.
ThepositivesignofitscoeﬃcientmeansthatthemorestronglyparticipantsbelieveGMingredients
are used in the current product, the more likely they will avoid GM products. The awareness does
not mean knowledge, so this result is not in conﬂict with the result reported in the literature that
scientiﬁc knowledge increases acceptance of biotechnology. Risk perception variable (RP) was
not included as an explanatory variable because it was too strongly correlated with the dependent
variable, which is a binary variable of choosing either GM or non-GM. The diﬀerence between the
8OLS and probit results is not necessarily unreasonable. The OLS and probit model are based on the
diﬀerent criteria, plus the dependent variables are diﬀerent, so the results need not exactly match
between the two models. It is important to recognize that the price diﬀerence variable (PDIFF)
is signiﬁcant and has an expected sign, so the participants responded to the price information in a
reasonable manner. The estimated coeﬃcients are used to compute the expected non-GM premium
for each individual so that the premium will be a variable in its own right.
It is interesting to compare diﬀerent estimates of the non-GM premium. Table 5 presents the
sample statistics for the alternative estimates of the non-GM premium. The column heading “auc-
tion” indicates the premium based on the original auction bids while “OLS” is the nonhypothetical
premium based on the prediction of the OLS regression. Likewise, “legal” indicates the premium
fromtheminimumlegalWTPmodelwhile“probit”isforthepremiumfromtheprobitanalysis. As
is evident from the table, the hypothetical non-GM premiums are higher than their nonhypothetical
counterparts as far as the central tendency is concerned. The auction and OLS premiums are close
to each other, with the OLS range (−56.34,244.82) smaller than the “auction” range (-200,450), as
is expected because OLS is a method of ﬁtting a line through the mean. Minimum legal premium
is not so much higher than the nonhypothetical premiums, which indicates the method’s name-
sake that the estimated WTP is minimum. The biggest drawback of the method is its ineﬃciency.
Furthermore, the estimated premium is expected to depend heavily on the distribution of price sce-
nario among the participants. In our study, the sample size is small, so the minimum legal WTP
model may not be quite reliable. The probit non-GM premium is by far the highest of all, with the
maximum premium being more than double the corresponding values for the original auction and
its OLS prediction. Since the sample size is small, we could not obtain a precise estimate of the
premium for the Japanese population, but we still use both the legal minimum and probit premiums
for the purpose of comparison between the hypothetical and nonhypothetical valuations to obtain
insights that might apply to a larger population.
Table 6 presents the OLS regression of hypothetical non-GM premium on nonhypothetical
non-GM premium. The NOAA guidelines advise that the hypothetical WTP be multiplied by 0.5
if there is no evidence otherwise (Arrow et al., 1993). This can be interpreted as the bias function
9having the following form:
(Hypothetical WTP) = α0 + α1 × (Nonhypothetical WTP),
where α0 is zero and α1 = 2. As table 6 indicates, we have no evidence that α0 is zero. This implies
that the current sample does not support the presumption that hypothetical bias may be removed
by the multiplication by 0.5. Instead, it suggests that the bias function has a more complex form if
there is a stable functional relation at all between the hypothetical and nonhypothetical WTPs. It
is not our purpose to ﬁnd such a functional form. We would rather consider how WTPs are related
by comparing mean hypothetical and nonhypothetical WTPs.
Table 7 gives the ratios of the hypothetical WTP to the nonhypothetical WTP. The ﬁgures in
the ﬁrst row were calculated by dividing the mean hypothetical WTP by the mean nonhypothet-
ical WTP. Since we had two hypothetical WTPs and two nonhypothetical WTPs, there are four
columns of ﬁgures. As is evident, the minimum legal WTP yields a quite comparable hypothet-
ical WTP because it involves as little inﬂation of WTP as possible. By contrast, the probit WTP
leads to serious hypothetical biases with hypothetical WTPs being more than twice as much as the
nonhypothetical WTPs. Nonetheless, the result shows that the NOAA guidelines may be a bit oﬀ
the mark. The second row presents the means of the bias factors calculated for each individual
except when the division by zero occurs. Here, the minimum legal WTP method does not perform
well, which suggests that there are some participants who has relatively small auction WTP but
casually choose the non-GM alternative in a hypothetical question. Even so, it gives a smaller bias
factor than the probit model, which produces even higher bias factors of around ﬁve. The last row
presents the bias factors based on the regression without intercept in table 6. Since the intercept is
highly signiﬁcant in all cases in table 6, the ﬁgures in the last row in table 7 are only for the sake
of additional comparison. Here, the minimum legal WTPs are once again quite comparable to the
nonhypothetical WTPs while the probit WTPs come much closer to the nonhypothetical WTPs.
So long as OLS prediction is used, we consistently obtain the evidence that probit model yields
some hypothetical bias. Our results also show that legal minimum WTPs are not as much biased.
Table 8 shows an interaction between hypothetical bias and ﬁeld-lab variation. In contrast to
10table 7, we measure the WTPs against the GM market price of 250 yen (although no mention
was made to this price when the auction bids were elicited). The column headings “Auction” and
“Survey” represent the original auction WTP and WTP resulting from the probit regression. The
percentage WTPs are calculated by dividing the auction and survey bids by the market price. If we
combine the ﬁeld and lab samples, we obtain the same result as in table 7, with bias factor of 2.64.
It is notable that the auction WTP of 34.6% is quite close to the observed retail market non-GM
premium of 30%.5 It is true that auction experiment need not elicit true consumer WTP because the
environment is essentially artiﬁcial, but our results indicate that experimental results closely match
the reality. We also included the information about interaction between the bias and setting. There
is a large diﬀerence between the ﬁeld and lab samples. As we observed in table 2, the auction WTP
is lower for the ﬁeld sample. However, the result is reversed for the survey WTP: the lab sample
actually has a lower hypothetical WTP. This comes from the fact that a smaller percentage of lab
sample chose non-GM in the binary hypothetical choice. This suggests that lab subjects are not
willing to pay for the GM oil when there is a real chance of buying it while they are when there is
no real chance. As was mentioned before, we cannot separate the sample and setting eﬀects, but
if there were no sample eﬀect, the above result would have an important implication for the use of
lab and ﬁeld experiments.
5 Conclusion
A series of experimental auctions were conducted to investigate the consumers’ homegrown values
for the non-GM and GM canola oil. The auction WTP was calculated by subtracting the bid for
GM oil from the bid for non-GM oil. The participants revealed a willingness to pay a non-GM
premium of roughly 30-40% of the market price of the GM oil. The estimated premium provides
yet another support for the claim that the Japanese consumers are willing to pay much to avoid the
GM products. Yet, the non-GM premiums derived from the auction were much smaller than the
hypothetical premiums if the probit model was used to derive them. But the probit model or related
models are routinely used to estimate a hypothetical WTP in many studies. Our results advise us
to take due caution when interpreting the ﬁndings of contingent valuation studies. The legal WTP
11model has not been used extensively in the contingent valuation literature, but the model has some
advantages such that it may bridge the gap between the hypothetical and nonhypothetical WTPs
with its conservatism in interpreting the respondents’ choices observed in hypothetical surveys.
The regression of WTP derived from auction bids showed that the risk perception, presence of
kids, and regular use of the product are signiﬁcant determinants. The more keen risk perception the
consumers have, the higher premium they are willing to pay for the non-GM product. Consumers
living with children are likely to spend more for the given non-GM product. Awareness, gender,
age, education, and income were not signiﬁcant determinants of the non-GM premium. The hy-
pothetical choice between the GM and non-GM products was not explained well by the above
demographic variables. Only awareness was signiﬁcant. However, the choice was well explained
by the price diﬀerence between the alternative products, which provides an added conﬁdence to
the estimation of WTP.
Since the sample is small and nonrandom, the sampling error cannot be calculated, and our
ﬁndings will not guarantee correct inferences about the consumers living in the Tokyo area, let
alone the entire country. Nonetheless, all of the participants were sampled from the general public,
not from college students. Hence, we can put more conﬁdence on the non-GM premium estimates
than if the student subjects were used. It is certainly helpful to conduct auction experiments in
a larger scale with more rigorously sampled subjects. In such a study, it is interesting to study
carefully the diﬀerence between the ﬁeld and lab settings. In our study, the ﬁeld participants
exhibited higher bids for both GM and non-GM products, yet they indicated a lower WTP than the
lab participants. This phenomenon could not be explained because it was not possible to separate
the sample group diﬀerence eﬀect and the setting diﬀerence eﬀect in our study. If the ﬁeld-lab
diﬀerence aﬀects the results in a meaningful and predictable way, studying such diﬀerential eﬀects
is most useful in applying the experimental auction method to many purposes including marketing
of novel or ambiguous product qualities.
In conclusion, we consider some practical implications of our results. As we observed, there is
potentially a large hypothetical bias involved in a stated-choice survey. Discounting a survey result
is certainly advised, but our experimental results suggest that the Japanese consumers still have a
12substantial willingness to pay a non-GM premium. Hence, non-GM products have a great market
opportunity in Japan. Our results also indicate that there are a large number of Japanese consumers
who are willing to pay a positive price for GM products. These consumers are willing to accept
GM foods so long as they are reasonably priced. In our analysis, the discount needed on the GM
foods is the ﬂip side of the non-GM premium, which is aﬀected by consumer risk perception. Thus,
it is expected that the acceptance of GM foods will increase if the level of risk perception becomes
lower. It is important that food manufacturers considering the marketing of GM foods take steps
to disabuse the consumers of the dangers (not risks) of consuming GM foods that may be input by
various groups vehemently opposing GM foods.
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Endnotes
1Many authors treat WTP values derived from experimental auctions as “real” WTPs. It is important to note,
however, experimental auction is nonetheless a contrived market. Therefore, we use the term “nonhypothetical” in this
article.
2We treat “nonlabeled” oil as GM oil because in all likelihood nonlabeled oil uses nonsegregated ingredients. If
segregated ingredients are used, the manufacturer should label its product as “non-GM.” Oil is exempt from mandatory
labeling, meaning that even though GM ingredients are clearly used, the manufacturer is not required to label its oil
product as GM.
3Ties were broken by random draws of straws.
4The subjects used for the present study consist of food shoppers of 18 years of age or older. However, some of the
ﬁgures for the Japanese population include Japanese people of 15 years of age or older (e.g., MARITAL) due to data
availability. Thus, the population ﬁgures are not strictly comparable.
5We purchased the non-GM canola oil at 325 yen and the GM canola oil at 250 yen. The non-GM premium is
exactly 30%.
14Table 1: Description of Sample Characteristics
Variable Deﬁnition Tsukuba Tokyo Japan
CANOLA 1 if canola oil is used regularly; 0.39 0.39 ···
0 otherwise. (0.50) (0.50)
GMUSE 1 if one knew if GM ingredients were used for oil; 0.59 0.44 ···
0 otherwise. (0.50) (0.51)
OILCON 1 if oil consumption is far more than average; 3.77 3.79 3.00
2 if a little more than average; (0.90) (0.96)
3 if about the average;
4 if a little more than average;
5 if far more than average;
RP 1 if GM foods are extremely or somewhat risky; 0.49 0.30 ···
0 otherwise. (0.51) (0.47)
GOV 1 if government regulations are excellent or good; 0.10 0.11 ···
0 otherwise. (0.31) (0.32)
AGE 49.16 47.23 48.29
(13.93) (11.82)
FEMALE 1 if female; 0.87 0.63 0.51
0 if male. (0.34) (0.49)
MARITAL 1 if married; 0.69 0.56 0.60
0 otherwise. (0.47) (0.51)
EDU 1 if bachelor’s or higher; 0.45 0.70 0.49
0 otherwise. (0.50) (0.47)
SIZE Household size. 2.97 2.81 3.23
(1.28) (1.11)
KIDS 1 if living with kids 18 years or younger; 0.39 0.25 0.28
0 otherwise. (0.50) (0.44)
INCOME Household income. 6.17 6.26 5.72
1 if less than 2 million yen; (3.10) (2.26)
2 if 2-3 million yen;
3 if 3-4 million yen
4 if 4-5 million yen
5 if 5-6 million yen
6 if 6-7 million yen
7 if 7-8 million yen
8 if 8-9 million yen
9 if 9-10 million yen
10 if 10-15 million yen
11 if 15 million yen or more.
LAB 1 if belonging in Tokyo group; ··· ··· ···
0 if belonging in Tsukuba group.
Num. Obs. 39 28.0 ···
15Table 2: Auction Bids for GM and Non-GM Canola Oil
Item Trial 1 Trial 2
Tsukuba Tokyo Tsukuba Tokyo
GM oil Mean 245.0 138.8 227.4 130.4
Std. Dev. 184.3 113.4 154.0 99.1
Median 250.0 150.0 250.0 150.0
% Zero 20.5% 28.6% 20.5% 32.1%
Non-GM oil Mean 319.3 241.9 306.5 250.0
Std. Dev. 154.3 127.0 121.9 110.5
Median 298.0 245.0 300.0 260.0
% Zero 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 7.1%
WTP Mean 74.3 103.1 79.1 119.6
Std. Dev. 84.1 152.6 76.7 151.6
Median 52.0 70.0 60.0 80.0
% of Base 29.7% 41.2% 31.6% 47.8%
Num. Obs. 39 28 39 28
Note: The percentage ﬁgures of WTP were calculated as the ratio of bid
diﬀerences to the market price of 250 yen.
Table 3: Regression of WTP values from Auction
Trial 1 Trial 2
Coeﬀ. Std.Err. Coeﬀ. Std.Err.
ONE −37.89 90.48 −24.04 87.03
GMUSE 20.67 33.32 27.22 32.05
RP 74.13∗∗ 33.19 79.14∗∗ 31.92
GOV 46.78 48.54 39.30 46.69
AGE −0.09 1.43 −0.07 1.37
FEMALE −22.34 39.39 −16.60 37.89
EDU1 −24.03 33.80 −13.34 32.51
KIDS 70.71∗ 40.16 66.74∗ 38.63
LINC 47.69 46.66 33.44 44.88
LAB 46.23 33.09 54.17 31.83
CANOLA −56.43∗ 31.47 −48.77 30.27
R-squared 0.28 0.28
Note: The symbols ** and * indicate that the coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.















Note: The symbol ** indicates that the coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 5: Sample Statistics of Alternative WTP values
Nonhypothetical Hypothetical
Auction OLS Legal Probit
Mean 86.36 82.48 117.39 228.40
Std.Dev. 117.52 62.42 89.65 89.59
Median 52.00 82.06 125.00 229.84
Minimum -200.00 -56.34 0.00 60.12
Maximum 450.00 244.82 450.00 421.71
Table 6: Regression of Hypothetical WTP on Nonhypothetical WTP
Legal Minimum WTP Probit WTP
Coeﬀ. t-ratio Coeﬀ. t-ratio Coeﬀ. t-ratio Coeﬀ. t-ratio
Auction
Constant 107.80 7.10 ··· ··· 212.16 13.55 ··· ···
Original Auction WTP 0.14 1.17 0.61 4.19 0.10 1.00 0.89 4.72
R-squared 0.03 -1.01 0.02 -3.88
OLS
Constant 101.85 4.43 ··· ··· 198.25 9.27 ··· ···
Predicted Auction WTP 0.25 1.06 1.09 6.08 0.28 1.33 1.82 8.70
R-squared 0.03 -0.45 0.04 -1.76
Table 7: Hypothetical-Nonhypothetical Bias Factors
Legal/Auction Probit/Auction Legal/OLS Probit/OLS
Ratios of Means 1.36 2.64 1.42 2.76
Means of Individual Ratios 3.61 5.26 2.06 4.88
Regression without Constant 0.61 0.89 1.09 1.82
17Table 8: Hypothetical Bias and Setting
Auction Survey
Both ﬁeld and lab WTP (% of Base) 34.6% 91.4%
Hyp/Auc 2.64
Field only WTP (% of Base) 29.7% 106.8%
Hyp/Auc 3.59
Lab only WTP (% of Base) 41.3% 72.3%
Hyp/Auc 1.75
18